Part 1 of this article was published on August 2, 2022.
The vast majority of Asian countries, with the exception of the closest American allies, have not accepted or supported anti-Russian sanctions that contradict their basic principles, and deny the very logic of such unilateral methods of uncovered economic war. Practical cooperation between Asia-Pacific countries on a non-confrontational basis continues to gain momentum, not only within the SCO, but also within the RIC, BRICS, the ASEAN dialogue structures and other regional platforms and forums.
In the context of modern challenges to security and development in the Asia-Pacific Region, strategic interaction between Russia and China in the new era, the coordinated position of the parties on which was set forth in the Joint Statement of the leaders of the two countries adopted on February 4, 2022, plays an important stabilizing role. Such interaction is objectively becoming the most vital factor in creating favorable conditions for laying the foundations of a new world order.
This synergy is designed to make up, in fact, one of the supporting pillars of the future Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), the main idea of which is to create a common space for cooperation on the Eurasian continent. Speaking at a plenary session of the Eurasian Economic Forum (Bishkek, May), Vladimir Putin emphasized the timeliness of the task of forming a comprehensive strategy for the development of such a partnership as a large civilizational project of equal cooperation, focused on “changing the political and economic architecture and becoming a guarantor of stability and prosperity throughout the continent”.
Global changes have not ignored the situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea predictably supported Russia, while the Republic of Korea joined the “Western camp,” although unlike Japan, it joined the sanctions without enthusiasm and obtained some leniency in the application of Western sanctions “rules”. The new South Korean government, mostly composed of staunch conservatives with ties to the United States, leaves little hope for easing tensions in the region. And the forceful pressure on the DPRK in the context of the split of the world provoked by the Westerners, including the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance and their cooperation with Japan, only destabilizes the situation, which causes a corresponding reaction of Pyongyang (a series of missile tests in the DPRK since January continues).
Afghanistan under the Taliban Movement (the Taliban is a terrorist organization banned in the RF) remains in the focus of attention of regional and world powers. The United States and its NATO allies, which are responsible for the critical plight of the Afghans, are indifferent to their problems. Human rights abuses serve as a pretext for providing token humanitarian aid instead of vital financial contributions to the country's economy. Trouble is added by the terrorist activities of the Islamic State (a terrorist organization banned in Russia), as well as the armed confrontation with the Taliban government by the opposition National Resistance Front, which adheres to guerrilla warfare tactics. Afghanistan’s partners are unanimous in their understanding of the need to form an inclusive government, reflecting the interests of the main ethno-political forces in the country, and to provide it with urgent assistance. The most important condition for interaction with Afghanistan is its establishment as a peaceful, independent state, free of terrorism and drug-related crime, observing basic human rights norms, and pursuing a policy of friendship and cooperation with neighboring and other states.
The EU-brokered Vienna talks between Iran and the United States to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and, accordingly, to lift unilateral U.S. sanctions have not yet brought concrete results. Washington stubbornly refuses to meet the Iranian conditions for agreement, the key of which are: removing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the list of terrorist organizations, as well as setting a realistic timetable for lifting sanctions and providing guarantees that they will not be renewed. The clash of positions intensified after the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution prepared by the United States, Britain, France and Germany, which criticized Iran for not explaining the traces of uranium at sites not declared to be related to the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic. Moscow and Tehran, in the current situation, demonstrate their desire to develop a constructive dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation, including in the energy, engineering, financial and banking, transport and logistics, agriculture and other fields, as was convincingly demonstrated by President Putin’s recent visit to Tehran, during which a summit meeting in the Astana format (Russia - Iran - Turkey) was held on Syria.
The Middle East, where global players have traditionally played a significant role, has been affected by the worsening global geopolitical situation, which has presented the countries of the region with a difficult choice. Most of the states in the region, including those traditionally considered allies of the United States, despite the pressure exerted on them, preferred a position of equidistance, not wanting to be drawn into a confrontation between the West and Russia. In fact, this has meant their refusal to unconditionally follow the fairway of Western policy, their growing uncertainty about the American ally, and, as a result, their increasing orientation toward the positions of an expanding circle of other global powers, including China and India.
The most important factor affecting the position of the countries in the region is the strengthening of Russia’s position in the Middle East, where it has regained its status as an influential external player and has made significant progress in developing multifaceted relations virtually with countries in the region, forming a sphere of common interests in security, economy, energy and the vision of a new world order. Biden’s recent visit to the Middle East only exposed the collapse of what was called U.S. “strategic oversight” of the region.
Thanks to Russia’s peacemaking efforts, the process of normalizing relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and stabilizing the region as a whole has begun to take positive shape. However, the tasks facing Baku and Yerevan to finally get out of the conflict and achieve mutual trust and agreement are quite complex. The stumbling block at this stage is the Armenian side’s demand for broad autonomy status for the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Azerbaijani side considers this issue as no longer relevant after the second Karabakh war and insists on recognizing the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the population of Azerbaijan with equal rights with other citizens of that state. There was also a desire on the part of the Westerners - the U.S., France, the European Union - to get involved in the Karabakh issue, which is aimed at squeezing Russia and securing the role of the main moderator in the sub-region, bypassing the OSCE Minsk Group format.
The situation in Central Asia remains complex. The U.S. is increasingly seeking to counter Russian influence throughout the post-Soviet space. Among these steps is the “Improving the Legal Environment” program funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is aimed at encouraging opposition in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. At the same time, Washington does not abandon the attempts to achieve deployment of the American military base in this part of Asia. The U.S. continues to focus on the matrix of the Greater Central Asia project, which provides for integration of the republics of former Soviet Central Asia with Afghanistan and Pakistan to create a kind of “barrier” on the Chinese trade routes to Europe and to create zones of instability in this “soft underbelly” of Russia. It cannot be excluded that the “abrupt” withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan was also motivated by this policy of Washington.
All Central Asian countries, and especially Kazakhstan, pursue a “multi-vector foreign policy”. The visit of the president of this country to Ankara in May, which resulted in the signing of the joint statement on the expanded strategic partnership, the memorandum on military-technical cooperation, and the intergovernmental protocol on cooperation in the sphere of military intelligence, was notable. The opposition continued to take steps - in March, there were new street demonstrations with populist demands for immediate reforms, accompanied by an information campaign on the Internet. On the eve of Victory Day in Kazakhstan, a group of Kazakh nationalists became more active, speaking in a spirit unfriendly to Russia against the backdrop of the RSO.
The situation on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, where there are regular shootouts and other incidents involving military personnel, is not quiet. In April, full-scale fighting erupted over a dispute over a water distribution point. In early June, there was again an exchange of fire and mortars in the Batken region.
Latin American and Caribbean (LACB) political development continued to be adversely affected by weak democratic institutions, politicized judicial systems, corruption scandals and high levels of crime and violence, as well as high levels of income inequality. Social and political polarization increased. Countries in the region continued to recover from the pandemic, but rising political risks had a negative impact on the sovereign ratings of several countries in the region. The results of the elections held there in the last period were multidirectional, but in general were accompanied by a further displacement of centrist forces in favor of more radical leftist and rightist circles (despite the heterogeneity, eclecticism, and populism of the respective organizations). According to expert estimates, the situation in Latin America is fraught with growing internal political contradictions.
At the same time, the LACB has not remained aloof from general global trends, such as regionalization. For example, at the Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles in June, there was a record absenteeism: because the U.S. refused to invite Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the leaders of Mexico, Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador did not participate in the Summit, while only 11 countries participated at a lower level. Only with the promise of a bilateral meeting was Biden able to persuade Brazilian President Bolsonaro to come to the Summit. It is worth bearing in mind that back at the Fourth Summit of the Americas in 2005, Washington’s Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA) project was “buried”.
In the context of recent pressing global issues, cyber threats can be singled out, given that since the start of the RSO in Ukraine, Russia has been subjected to an unprecedented number of cyber-attacks that have effectively assumed the scale of a cyber-war, in violation of the few existing international agreements in this area. In anticipation of retaliation, Western nations are increasing funding for cyber defense programs, and an increasing number of private sector organizations are engaging in a global cyber arms race. High-tech state actors are expected to outsource their offensive cyber technology to allies and proxies, accelerating the uncontrolled spread of such dangerous technologies.
Recent world events have also had a disruptive effect on the evolution of the international information security negotiation process. Initiatives aimed at torpedoing an acceptable system of information security have intensified. In particular, during the “summit for democracy,” the U.S. proposed the creation of an “alliance for the future of the Internet” - as “an alternative vision of the global network as an instrument of state control”. This, it is believed, can be seen as an attempt to lay the groundwork for a kind of NATO-style digital alliance directed against Russia and China as powerful Internet powers with their own independent policies. Against this background, the initiatives and efforts proposed and undertaken by the Russian Federation aimed at maintaining an inclusive dialogue and equitable international cooperation while preserving the key role of states in decision-making and the central role of the UN as the central negotiating forum on international information security are crucial for further negotiating on all aspects of this issue.
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International events of recent time, reflecting the acceleration of the pace of tectonic changes on the world stage, clearly demonstrate an extremely acute strengthening of the struggle between two cardinally opposing trends: protective - the desire of the West to maintain its dominance in global politics, economy and finance, and transformational - democratization of international relations in accordance, including, with the imperatives of the cultural and civilizational diversity of the world with its multiplicity of value systems and models of development and reliance on universal international legal instruments. The totality of modern trends objectively “votes” in favor of moving towards a polycentric system of coordinates of world politics on an inclusive and equal basis, including mutual consideration of the interests of states, as the only one capable of ensuring real security and prosperity in the face of a set of new threats and challenges to all mankind, such as environmental degradation and climate change. In fact, the new global agenda is opposed to the old agenda, which refers to the past and the ideological and other prejudices of Western elites, their self-serving interests.
Rector of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011-2019) Alexander Yakovenko
